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Currently, more of the containerized imports from Far East to the US inland market 
are handled by the U.S. west coast ports mainly compared to the U.S. East Coast 
ports mainly due to the better overall performance achieved in the intermodal 
shipment by virtue of the deployment of post-Panamax containerships, 
state-of-the-art infrastructure at major west coast ports together with the liner and rail 
service surrounding these ports. While with the completion of the Panama Canal 
expansion in the early 2016, there is a wide speculation as to if there will be a 
paradigm shift in routing options for these discretionary containerized imports and 
where will most of these containerized imports likely to enter the U.S. in the new 
normal. 
In this study, the port choice analysis using the Multinomial Logistic Regression 
(MLR) is conducted to look into the various potential predict variables which could 
help to find out which factors are of great concerns to shippers in their routing 
decisions through which a port of entry is chosen. Then, the potential changes in 
some of factors due to the expansion of Panama Canal are taken into account for the 
MLR model to further evaluate the potential impact of Panama Canal expansion on 
the port choice by shippers. Finally, some of evaluation and conclusion of this study 
is presented. 
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The Panama Canal, with its unique location at the narrowest point of Isthmus of 
Panama between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, has had a far-reaching effect on 
world economic and commercial developments throughout most of this century. 
Since the Panama Canal first opened in 1914, it has been a significant piece in the 
global trade network which has served over one million vessel transits around the 
world – as of 2014, it is serving more than 144 maritime trade routes connecting 160 
countries and reaching about 1,700 ports worldwide with an aggregate share of 5% 
of global seaborne trade
1
. Of its various market segments, the full container vessels 
segment is consistently the most important one which constituted 3.7% of total 
maritime trade volume transiting the Canal in terms of metric ton while 
contributing47.8% of the overall Canal toll revenues for fiscal year 2014.  
In recent decades, the Panama Canal has come under pressure to cope with 
ever-increasing transit demands from various users which reversely hamper the 
further expansion of its business with its existing set of Panamax Locks and relevant 
supporting facilities. As evidenced by the full container vessels segment, some major 
indicators reflecting its performance showed various extents of under-performance, 
with the total transits of containerships declining at the annual rate of 6.8% since 
2012, the corresponding total TEU capacity of containerships also contracted to a 
lesser extent from12.2 million to 11.6 million TEU capacity due to the steady 
increase in the average container vessel size from 3,659TEUs in fiscal year 2012 to 
4,004 TEUs in the fiscal year 2014. 
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 According to the latest statistics by Annual Report of PCA, 2014  
2 
To retain its position as the critical element of the global transportation network, the 
Panama Canal expansion project which initiated in 2007 is currently under final 
construction with the aim of doubling the Canal’s maximum cargo-carrying capacity 
in terms of PCUMS Tons
2
 to allow the transit of larger vessels that are currently 
restricted by the dimensions of the existing Canal locks and to maximize the Canal’s 
total possible volume of cargo and other traffic. 
To be more detail, the expansion of the canal is composed of the following five main 
components: 
1. Construction of a new set of Neo-Panamax Locks, one at the Atlantic     
(North) and another at the Pacific (South) ends of the Canal; 
2. Deepening and widening the Canal entrances； 
3. Excavation of a new north access channel for the Pacific Neo-Panamax    
Locks; 
4. Elevation of Gatun Lake’s maximum operation level; 
5. Deepening and widening of the Gatun Lake and Culebra Cut     
navigational channels 
As for the containerships, the maximum capacity of the vessel that could transit the 
Panama Canal will significantly increase from the current capacity of 4,400 TEUs to 




                                                             
2
  The abbreviation of “Panama Canal/Universal Measurement System”, which is the basic unit measure of 
cargo volumes moving through the Panama Canal. 
3 
Figure 1. The Comparison of vessel sized and locks  
 
Source: Panama Canal Authority, Canal Expansion Program – Components Report, p. 6, 
April 2012.Available at: http://www.pancanal.com/eng/expansion/rpts/components/2012.pdf 
At the same time, the Panama Canal Authority will also introduce a whole new toll 
system to encourage the use of the much larger new locks for the transit of larger 
Post-Panamax vessel when the expansion is complete. 
In view of the aforementioned latest update of the operation of the Panama Canal and 
its expansion, the majority of industry practitioners as well as academia researchers 
generally believe that the container shipping on several major trade lanes via the 
expanded Panama Canal will greatly benefit from the unprecedented economies of 
scale resulting from the deployment of much larger, more fuel-efficient 
Post-Panamax containerships which will significantly lower the unit operating costs 
for ocean carriers. Among the various trade lanes via the Panama Canal, the East 
4 
Coast of U.S. to Asia (All-Water Route) which accounts for nearly 37% of total 
traffic transiting the Canal is expected to gain more momentum in the competition 
against other major traditional routing options for the U.S. containerized imports 
from the Far East mainly due to the potential significant unit cost reduction for the 
long-haul ocean transportation. 
Historically, the U.S. West Coast ports represented by the Port of Los Angeles and 
Port of Long Beach handled the majority of the U.S. Containerized imports from 
Asia either bound for the large local markets where the ports located or destined for 
the vast U.S. hinterland area through the advanced intermodal rail network. As a 
whole, the major West Coast gateway terminals are almost equipped with 50-feet 
berth depth as well as navigational channel, coupled with sufficient Post-Panamax or 
Super-Post-Panamax quay cranes at berths and average container storage space of 
100 to 400 acres in size, all of these terminal infrastructures combined with the 
developed intermodal transportation have enabled ports to accommodate the growing 
amount of the cargo on board the prevailing mega Post-Panamax containerships 
especially from the Far East in a cost-effective and reliable manner.  
While in the recent few years, due to the issues such as shortage of chassis, lack of 
rail capacity as well as ever-worsening port congestion resulting from the growing 
demands for containerized imports from U.S. consumers, west coast ports’ position 
as the leading gateway for the U.S imports is somewhat eroded. An observable 
amount of cargos are gradually being diverted to the U.S East Coast ports as well as 
ports in Mexico and Canada by shippers to mitigate mounting uncertainties incurred 
on the west coast intermodal routes. As the consequence, the U.S. East Coast ports 
have gradually closed the gap with its West coast counterparts in terms of their 
respective share of U.S. containerized imports. In 2014, East Coast and Gulf Coast 
5 
ports combined represented 46% of the total container volumes from Asia to the U.S. 
while that figure stood at around 35% the year before
3
.  
Considering that the overall performance of major U.S East Coast gateways is still to 
various extent not competitive with their west coast counterparts in terms of harbor 
depths, the scale of high-performance terminal infrastructure and connectivity with 
the surface transportation network, the higher-than-expected performance achieved 
by the East Coast ports is generally viewed as the result of temporary cargo diversion 
from the West Coast ports to avoid the severe backlog of both cargos and 
containerships caused by the unsettled labor contract dispute between ILWU and 
PMA which represent interests of the employees and employers of ports respectively.  
It remains to be seen whether the staying power of the cargo diversion from the West 
Coast to the East Coast will continue even after the backlog of cargos and vessels are 
cleared up in the West Coast. For the time being, nearly all the major U.S. East Coast 
ports are scrambling to deepen their respective harbors and upgrade their respective 
terminal infrastructure in anticipation of better accommodating greater amount of 
cargos and post-Panamax containerships that could transit the Expanded Panama 
Canal in the early 2016.  
When it comes to the major trade lane serving the US containerized import from the 
Far East, there are currently altogether three alternative routes at the discretion of the 
shippers: The intermodal routes moving through the U.S west coast gateways are still 
preferred by most shippers although their growth rate of market share is gradually 
overtaken by their East Coast competitors; All-water route via Panama Canal is 
                                                             





viewed as more cost-effective and reliable routing option for cargo bound for the 
East Coast while it further development is strictly restrained by the size limit of the 
existing Panamax locks as well as by the overall capacity of various East coast ports; 
the All-water route via the Suez Canal is currently gaining growing popularity 
among some top ocean carriers as an alternative to All-water route via the Panama 
Canal due to the greater economies of scale inherent in the deployed post-Panamax 
containerships. 
It is generally believed that there are likely to be paradigm shift in the routing options 
for the U.S. containerized imports from Asia, especially for those cargos which 
bound for the inland part of the U.S. (hereinafter called “Discretionary Cargo
4
”) after 
the Panama Canal expansion is completed. The Panama Canal administrator Jorge 
Quijano said that it is very likely that the Panama Canal will benefit from a 
permanent shift of some cargos to the alternative gateways up and down the east 
coast. In addition, a survey conducted by Maersk Line also revealed the similar 
feedback from its customers that “a substantial portion of the discretionary cargos 
will be diverted to East and Gulf coast ports simply because shippers need more than 
one gateway for their shipments so that their potential bets will be hedged.” A study 
commissioned by PMA also estimated that the price levels on the all-water Panama 
Canal route for Asia cargo bound for Chicago will significantly drop 12-14 percent 
from $3,200 to $2,800 per 40-foot container in the three to seven years following the 
expansion of the canal. 
While at the same time, other arguments tend to dim the prospects of the cargo 
diversion from the West coast ports. Some experts contend that most of the 
high-valued commodity will be invariably moving through the west coast gateway 
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Discretionary Cargo refers to those containerized imports bounded for the destination which is far away from 
the location where the port of entry is located. 
7 
since the inventory-in-transit involved in the shipment is much lower compared to 
the time-consuming all-water route. Others are of the opinion that if only the west 
coast ports’ terminal operators could manage their operation without any man-made 
disruption, the west coast intermodal routes is the most reliable route as it was for 
shippers since the capability of the expanded Panama Canal as well as the upgraded 
East Coast ports to handle increased containerized imports and mega containerships 
in a timely and reliable way will be a great challenge to meet. 
Despite the above various opinions on the potential effect of the Panama Canal 
expansion on the shifting trade flow within the U.S., the competition among various 
gateways on both seaboards for the discretionary cargos will mostly likely to 
intensify as shippers intend to get the most out of the expanded Panama Canal to 
diversify their routing options for their shipments in case of any uncontrolled 
disruption as exemplified by the lingering port congestion in the west coast. In that 
sense, the ability to preciously understand the interaction of a wide variety of factors 
valued by shippers involved in the port choice for their individual shipment will be 
the key to the success in retaining their current market share as well as attracting new 
business in the era of the expanded Panama Canal.  
The paper will be organized as follows: Chapter 2 will have an overview literature 
view on the topic of port choice from the perspective of Shipper or Carriers; Chapter 
3 will introduce and present various sources of data for the further analysis; Chapter 
4 will introduce the intended Analysis Model, fit the compiled data to the model to 
find out the most pronounced factors behind the port choice by the shipper and then 
the modified data on the relevant factors will be input into the dataset to predict if the 
possibility of the each US east coast ports being chosen as port of entry for the Asia 
origin shipments will improve after the completion of the Panama Canal Expansion. 
8 
Chapter 5 will draw the conclusion from this study and give some recommendation 




Chapter 2: Literature View 
 
2.1 Rationale behind Port Choice 
The container shipping industry is generally viewed as a derived demand of cargo 
owners for international merchandise trade. With the introduction of the Ocean 
Shipping Act of 1998, the ocean freight rates were no longer fixed between the given 
port-pair among various shipping companies, but rather the rates were negotiated 
individually by the shippers and ocean Carriers and kept confidential as the business 
secret. 
Many studies have been conducted to look into the reasons why BCO
5
 tends to 
choose a particular port over the other available options for their shipment options. 
Of which, some studies agree that attributes not under the control of port 
management are more important than attributes under port management control in 
the port selection process as exemplified by Malchow and Kanafani, 2004 and 
Anderson et al., 2009. 
                                                             
5
Abbreviation of “Beneficial Cargo Owner”, which is used interchangeably with “shipper” and “cargo Owners” in 
this study. 
9 
However, there is a common major deficiency in many of these studies in that their 
models did not include many of the port characteristic and service options that are, 
indeed, under the direct control of port managers. Instead, these studies simply 
assumed that the factors under the control of port management were less of a factor 
in the port choice process and did not need to be included in the model, which is 
evident by the study conducted by Anderson et al., (2009) who suggested that since 
the major container ports are all modern and large, productivity across them would 
not vary that enough to influence the port choice decision. 
In addition, some other studies concluded that the impact of the level of freight rates 
on the ports choice was just too little to be taken into account. 
Malchow and Kanafani (2001, 2004) acknowledged the omission of transportation 
price (cost) in their port choice study, but stated that this omission was without 
consequence since price (cost) variability across sea ports was quite minimal. 
As a whole, all of the above assumptions that these variables have less importance 
compared to the other factors in a port choice model have not been empirically 
investigated in a rigorous manner. 
While other studies tended to include as much influential factors into their model as 
possible. There are quite a few studies viewing port choice from the perspective of 
the ocean carrier as the principal decision maker. 
In some cases, these studies model the process as the shippers choosing a port 
dependent on their chosen ocean carriers calling at that port; in other studies, the 
process is viewed as the ocean carrier deciding to call at a particular port. 
The study commissioned by Malchow and Kanafani,(2001, 2004); Fleming and 
10 
Hayuth, (1994); Lirn et al., 2004); Song and Yeo, (2004)assuming the critical role of 
the ocean carrier in the sea port selection have found that distance, both oceanic and 
inland, are important factors affecting the choice of certain ports.  
First, some studies contend that the shippers select an ocean carrier and turnover the 
route and sea port choice decisions to that ocean carrier. In accordance with this 
viewpoint, the shippers do not make the final decisions about individual sea ports as 
evidenced by the study conducted by Slack, 1985; Fleming and Hayuth, 1994; 
Malchow and Kanafani, 2001, 2004. As they argue it is especially the case of some 
big box retailers who prefer carriers’ door-to-door delivery which can offer them 
on-time and cost-effective service regardless of any chosen ports of entry for their 
shipments. 
On the contrary, multiple papers also focus a great deal on the role of the shippers in 
the process of port selection for their respective shipments. These studies regarded 
the shipper as making a sea port selection decision initially, followed by the selection 
of the ocean carrier based on the available ocean carriers serving the selected port. 
The conclusion of these studies is that the same set of factors influences the sea port 
selection regardless of who makes the choice. For instance, distance by Tiwari et al., 
2003a,b; Anderson et al.,2009), transit time related to distance (Nir et al., 2003; 
Anderson et al., 2009), port congestion (Tiwari et al., 2003b), port efficiency, 
reliability, infrastructure (Guy and Bruno, 2006; Tongzon, 2009; Anderson et al., 
2009), cost(Guy and Bruno,2006;Tongzon, 2009; Anderson et al., 2009), and port 
connectivity Tang et al., (2011)were found to be significantly related to the choice of 
a port. In addition, Tabernacle (1995) showed that crane productivity is very 
important measure of port performance and Baird (1996) suggested that faster ship 
turnaround time within the port contributes positively to port advancement. High 
11 
crane productivity facilitates faster vessel operations at ports, speedier delivery, and 
lower total transit time. Therefore, crane productivity could benefit the shipper as 
well. 
Tiwari et al.(2003a), Tongzon (2009)and Anderson et al. (2009)contended that the 
ultimate decision about the route, including the individual seaport, lies with the 
shippers including importers or exporter or their designated agents. 
A few studies commissioned by Lirn et al., (2004); Tongzon and Sawant, (2007); 
Tongzon et al., (2008) in this field have also found that port infrastructure, port 
charges, port efficiency, berth availability and size are important attributes ocean 
carriers consider in deciding which ports to call.  
 
2.2 Analytical Method  
Regarding the major analytical methods applied to the port choice, the followings are 
generally recognized as the most useful ones. 
The discrete choice model relies on the set of independent variable coefficients in 
equation one (the aggregate ocean freight rate model) to compute fitted ocean freight 
rate values for individual shipments. It is used in estimating the effects of these 
variables on the chances of selecting a port for a shipment and the alternatives 
available to shippers are the various ports they can choose from. To be specific, the 
conditional logistic (McFadden, 1974) model is better suited than the multinomial 
logistic since we are investigating alternative specific attributes instead of a case 
specific attribute effect on the choice of the alternative. 
12 
Veldman and Beckmann (2003) used a logistic model to explain the market share of 
the port’s routings for each of the traffic zones or regions that comprise a port’s 
potential hinterland. They quantified the routing choice and placed considerable 
importance on deriving a demand function to forecast port traffic and market shares 
for use in the economic and financial evaluation of container port projects. They 
consider logistic models are important tools for assessing container market shares in 
an overlapping market/network where a part of the network has to be singled out 
without loss of consistency. 
Niret. al look at port choice behavior from the viewpoint of the shipper and apply 
multinomial logistic models to investigate the preferences “revealed” on a survey 
for alternative of ports in Taiwan. However where Veldman and Nir opt for stated 
preference analysis for calibrating their models, there are advantages to using 
revealed preference methods when there is an abundance of secondary data and to 
avoid the short-comings or biases of stated preference methods. A cross disciplinary 
investigation of competitive positioning by McNamara, Deephouse et al. 
(2003)infers that the development of firms, which is also be applicable to ports, is 
based on resources and their effects on competitive positions. 
Tsung-Sheng Chang (2008) studied how to select best routes for shipments through 
the international intermodal network and formulated the international intermodal 
routing problem as a multi-objective multimodal multi-commodity flow problem. 
Leachman (2008) describes an economic optimization model of waterborne 
containerized imports from Asia to the U.S. where imports are allocated to 
alternative ports and logistics channels so as to minimize total transportation and 
inventory costs for importers. 
13 
Imai et. Al on the other hand studied two typical service networks with different ship 
sizes: multi-port calling by conventional ship size and hub-and-spoke by mega-ship 
with a carrying capacity of more than 10,000 TEUs by investigating the service 
network design and container distribution. 
Fan et. al factor the Panama Canal into their cost optimization model that integrates 
international and North America inland transport networks to ascertain optimal ship 
size, route, port, and interior shipping corridor and argues that these are highly 
reflective of observed shipments. The model developed by Fan determines least 
(ocean and rail) cost routings subject to constraints which when relaxed to 
incorporate the new Canal dimension and shows that diversion of larger vessels 
through the Canal is currently limited by the draft restrictions of East coast ports. 
A recent study presented at TRB Annual meeting in Washington in January 2011 is 
relevant to this research. This model simulates changes in the flow of international 
containerized cargo, stemming from investments in ports and reduction in charges. 
The study uses a cost minimization strategy to factor the effects of scale economies 
in container shipping and the impact of the construction of deeper container berths on 
carrier shipping pattern decisions and compares the results to actual shipping patterns 
to investigate the paramount factors that influence the utility of discrete preference 
for a port by the carrier and subject to existing constraints, determine where that 
utility is highest. 
To sum up, these aforementioned literatures were conducted to have a general view 
of the impact of various factors on the port choice. But to my best knowledge, there 
is not many study focus on impact of any change of factors on the port choice by 
shipper. In this sense, this paper will choose to adopt the multinomial logistic 
regression to the analysis of the port choice among U.S. BCOs for their shipments 
14 
from Asia and try to find out the most critical factors which can best explain decision 
of the port choice by shippers. And any variation in the certain factors due to the 




Chapter 3: Model Formulation 
 
 
3.1 Preparation of Study 
As previously stated, there are currently three alternatives for the containerized 
import shipment from Asia to the US. In the current context, each alternative has 
their own advantages over others in the different parts of the U.S. BEAs. For the 
intermodal route via the West Coast port, it historically handled nearly 50% of total 
U.S. containerized import. By 2013, the West Coast ports’ share had fallen to 43.5%. 
Some industry practitioners take the view that although the intermodal route still 
enjoy the significant advantage in time savings and the marginal cost savings to the 
most parts of the U.S., the recent port congestion within the Southern California port 
range represented by the Port of Los Angeles and Long Beach, has gradually take 
their toll on the normal performance of these major gateways which in turn adversely 
impact the dominance of the Port of LA and LB for the majority of US containerized 
imports especially for the discretionary container cargos bounded to Midwest part of 
the country. 
15 
The all-water routing is gradually gaining increased popularity among the US east 
coast regions within which the major gateways up and down Atlantic Seaboard are 
located. Although the transit time from the major gateways from Asia to the US East 
Coast ports is much longer for the all-water route than for the intermodal route, the 
substantial unit cost saving gained by the use of much-larger post-Panamax vessel 
deployed on the All-water service via the Suez Canal has even be more competitive 
with the intermodal routes for the cargos destined to the major metropolitan areas in 
the east coastal regions. What is more, the All-water route via the Panama Canal is 
relatively less time-consuming compared to the All-water route via the Suez Canal to 
the most of Middle and South Atlantic gateways. The size of the containership that 
can pass through the current Panama Canal is restricted to less than 5,000 TEUs. As 
a result, the market share of the all-water service for the East coast is gradually 
decline from the historic high of 80% achieved five years ago to nearly below 50% 
as compared to the All-water route via the Suez Canal.  
But when the newly-expanded Panama Canal is completed by the end of 2015, a 
huge amounts of post-Panamax containerships which has deployed on other major 
trade routes and greater amounts of cargo on board are allowed to transit the canal 
and therefore present the golden opportunity to the multiple major gateways in the 
east coast to better safeguard their respective market share for the local market, but 
also the promising heartland market where the large amount of discretionary cargos 
are up for grabs for ports on both coasts.  
According to official announcement by TSA
6
, more than 90% of total Asia-U.S. 
container traffic moves under 12-month service contract, which means the majority 
of BCOs in the U.S. conclude their service contracts with their preferred shipping 
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Abbreviation of “Transpacific Stabilization Agreement”, which is a research and discussion forum of major 
ocean container shipping lines that serve the transpacific trade in both directions between Asia and the U.S. 
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lines to fix the price and term of services usually ahead of the May 1
st
of each year. 
Usually these BCOs are mainly some big-box retailers and some other enterprises 
which have constant demand of imports from Asia. In the next chapter, the major 
factors determining the port choice by multiple BCOs for their respective container 
shipments will be analyzed to find out the relative importance among them. 
With regard to the distribution of U.S. containerized imports, the State of Illinois 
ranks the highest among all the inland states in terms of trade volumes. For the time 
being, up to 65% of containerized imports bound for the Midwest are moving 
through the West Coast ports, while the East and Gulf Coast ports share the 
remaining share. The upcoming Panama Canal Expansion is generally viewed as the 
game change for the port choice involved in the routing options of discretionary 
cargos by shippers due to the projection that the USEC ports will have greater chance 
to grab portion of cargo from their west coast counterparts. 
 
Given the aforementioned status quos as a whole, the U.S. containerized imports 
from Shanghai of China to the Chicago of the U.S. is selected as the most 
representative trade flow which is most likely to be influenced by the expansion of 
Panama Canal mainly due to the following reasons: 
1. China is so far the largest source of U.S. imports from Asia, which accounts for 
more than 78% of total import from the Northeast Asia. Despite the tendency 
toward some shift in labor-intensified manufacturing industry from China to the 
much-cheaper South-East Asia regions
7
, China is still expected to maintain its 
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leading role in the manufacturing industry to better meet the surging demand of 
US consumers due to the ever-growing U.S. economy.  
2. Shanghai, as the largest container gateway in China, is especially singled out as 
the Port of Loading in this study just for the simplicity purpose. 
3. Chicago metropolitan area, as the one of the largest and most important US 
interior market, is most renowned for its superior surface network linking itself to 
the rest of the U.S..  
4. As a practice, most of the long-haul inland shipment with a distance of over 800 
miles is best suited to be delivered on rail other than on truck with the 
consideration of delivery reliability and cost effectiveness. As a matter of fact, all 
the major Class I railroad in the U.S. has various service network directly to the 
Chicago and some major East Coast railroads are striving to update their 
infrastructure to offer better access from the main gateways on the East seaboard 
to the Midwest, so the potential improvements for the East Coast railroad can be 
expected from the following years after the Canal expansion. 
 
 
3.2 Source of Data 
3.2.1 Individual Shipments information 
The basic supporting information on individual shipment in this study is solely 
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derived from the PIERS
8
, the most comprehensive database of US waterborne trade 
in the world, from which about 317 records
9
 of the individual container shipments of 
different shippers from Shanghai as the Port of Loading in China to Chicago as the 
destination of shipments during a period of month in July of 2014 are available 
through the spreadsheet generated by the system of website according to the 
specified requirements. The major information provided in each individual shipment 
consists of the following items: 
a.   The Name of ocean carrier for the shipments 
b.   Port of Loading 
c.   POE in the U.S. 
d.   TEUs of each shipment 
e.   The weight of the shipment  
f.   The approx. value of the shipment  
g.   The name of the commodity  
 
This set of data will not be used directly as the input of the model analysis to be 
discussed in the next chapter. Rather, the name of ocean carrier for each shipment 
will further give information on the vessel-operating attributes of each carrier; the 
attributes of POEs through which each shipment moves can be obtained on the 
official website of each port authority; the TEU & Weight aspect of each shipment 
will be used as the input for the calculation of the U.S. rail freight cost for the inland 
delivery.  
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The abbreviation of “Port Import Export Reporting Service”, which is a world renowned database for US 
waterborne trade with other countries in the world. “ where the dataset of individual Shipment between two 
end point of trade flow can be attained  
9
 These 317 records of container shipment is elaborately selected to include as many different shippers as 
possible during a typical peaking shipping season as exemplified by July in 2014 
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3.2.2 Overview of U.S. Seaports in the Dataset 
Geographically, there are three major the port ranges situation located in different 
coast of the US. The West Coast port is mainly composed of the five gateway ports 
(Port of LA, Port of LB, Port of Oakland, Port of Tacoma and Port of Seattle) in 
Southern California, Northern California and Pacific Northwest which as a whole 
handles more than 60% of the US imports from Asia as of 2014
10
; East Coast Ports 
up and down the Atlantic seaboard is relatively small in port size and less 
competitive with their west coast counterparts in terms of their capacity to handle the 
prevalent post-Panamax vessels. As for the Transpacific eastbound trade lanes, up to 
90% of total container shipments are moving either through the West Coast or East 
Coast ports, only the port of Houston rank among the Top 10 U.S. ports in 2013 as 
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“3 Reasons Panama Canal Won’t Divert Imports from West to East Ports.” Universal 
Cargo Management,  March 2013. Available form  
http://www.universalcargo.com/blog/bid/95228/3-Reasons -Panama- Canal- Expansion- 
Won-t-Divert-Imports-from-West-to-East-Coast   
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Figure 2. Top 10 U.S. Container Ports in 2013 
 
Source: Journal of Commerce PIERS – Port Import/Export Reporting Service 
 
According to the 317 individual shipment records compiled from the PIERS, they 
almost moved through eight major container gateway ports to enter the U.S.. With   
some other USEC and Gulf coast ports such as Houston, Miami and Charleston 
respectively handled a relatively far less share of container shipments compared to 
the major eight port of entry, so they are intentionally omitted from the dataset of this 
study. 









1 Long Beach 75 23.7%
2 Los Angeles 63 19.9%
3 Tacoma 51 16.1%
4 New York 38 12.0%
5 Savannah 35 11.1%
6 Oakland 23 7.3%
7 Norfolk 18 5.7%
8 Wilmington 13 4.1%  
Source: The data compiled from the container shipments of PIERS 
It can be clearly seen from the table that the most of shipments were concentrated 
within west coast and east coast ports, with only a few exceptions belonged to the 
Gulf Coast, Canadian and Mexico gateways which are excluded from this study. 
 
3.2.3. Container Terminal Attributes 
As shown in the below Table 2, these in-depth information of individual port is 
collected from the official website of each port authority to which it belongs. The 
most of the U.S. seaport is composed of several container terminals which are either 
operated by the port authority itself or by the private owners. In addition, a couple of 
attributes within the same port, let alone the heterogeneity of attributes exist among 












LA West Basin 1 2500 2 53 8 Yes 136
West Basin 2 2500 2 45 5 Yes 186
Trans P 5400 4 45~53 10 No 185
Yusen 5800 2 45 8 Yes 185
Seaside 3200 2 45 8 Yes 205
Eagle Marine 4000 3 45~50 16 Yes 292
APM 5279 5 55 14 Yes 393
CUT 1950 1 55 5 Yes 91
LB TTI-Pier T 5000 5 55 14 Yes 385
PCT-Pier J 5900 6 49~50 15 Yes 256
ITS-Pier G 6379 4 42~52 6 11 Yes 258
LBCT-Pier F 2750 3 50 2 5 Yes 102
SSA7-Pier A 3600 4 50 10 Yes 200
SE T-18 4440 4 50 1 6 Yes 196
T-30 2700 2 50 3 3 No 65
T-46 2300 2 50 3 2 No 88
TA APM 2200 2 51 4 1 No 132
Evergreen 2260 2 51 7 Yes 141
Husky 2700 2 51 2 2 Yes 93
Olympic 1100 1 51 4 Yes 54
Washington 2000 2 51 2 4 Yes 47
OA Maersk 3512 3 42 7 No 102
TransBay 2172 2 50 4 No 66
TraPac 2172 2 50 4 No 66
Ben E. Nutter 3119 3 50 4 No 58
Hanjin 2400 2 50 4 No 120
Oakland Intl. 3600 3 50 6 No 151
APL 2743 4 42 4 No 79
Charles P. 1946 2 42 4 No 50
NK Norfolk 7300 5 50 14 Yes 693
NY/NJ NY Container 3012 3 45 9 Yes 187
APM Terminal 6001 6 50 4 8 3 No 347
Maher Terminal 10128 8 50 9 7 Yes 445
















Source: Based on Data from the Official Website of Major U.S. Gateway Ports 
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Apart from the attributes of port facilities included in the above table, the port 
productivity is also important comprehensive measure of operating efficiency of 
given port. According to the JOC Port Productivity, the Port of Los Angeles and Port 
of Long Beach has long dominated the ranking in terms of the total container moves 
per vessel per hour, while several major East Coast ports have gradually catch up 
with some of their west coast counterparts even though they are relatively less 
competitive with regard to their ability to accommodate the larger containerships in 
the current context, the average port productivity of each individual port terminal is 
shown in Table 3.  
Table 3. Average Vessel Productivity of Major US Gateways  
      (Total Container Moves per Vessel per Hour) 
Port of Entry LA LB TA OA NK NY/NJ SAV WIL
Vessel
Productivity
80 70 68 63 62 65 64 60
 
Source: Port Productivity Report by JOC, 2014  
As an increasingly number of larger containerships deployed to the market, the 
ability of container terminal to handle the vessel in the efficient manner will greatly 
reduce the potential increased time vessels stay in port, which in turn helps to ensure 
the economies of scale inherent in the larger vessel during the period of port 
operation. 
Of all these attributes concerning the port terminal, several of these will be selected 




3.2.4 Vessel Operating Attribute  
a. Vessel Size  
During the past decades, the average size of the containerships deployed on the 
transpacific US West Coast trade lane has grown steadily from 4564 TEUs in 2003 
to 7894 TEUs in 2013
11
. With the formation of four mega shipping alliance in the 
main East-West trade lanes, liner shipping companies is vigorously capitalize on the 
alliance operation to achieve improved economies of scale through better vessel 
utilization, wider port coverage and more frequent weekly services. More 
importantly, the competition among major shipping lines are not discounted as a 
result of the alliance operation, the fact is that the shipping lines belonging to the 
same alliance offer quite different service from their follow member liners. As for 
the shippers, this is no doubt the welcoming news since they will have more choice 
of service for their container shipments.  
The detail information on the deployment of container vessels by various shipping 
lines on the transpacific trade lane for the intermodal shipment is compiled from the 
individual shipment record provided by the PIERS as shown in Table 4. 
 
Table4. The Deployments of Vessels by various Shipping lines on Transpacific 
Routes 
                                                             
11
 Romelda Ascutia, “Asia Cargo diverted to USEC grows amid USWC congestion”, PortCalls Asia, February 
18, 2015, available from http://www.portcalls.com/asia-cargo-diverted-to-usec-grows-amid-uswc-congestion/ 
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Alliance Vessel Name Ownership
Nominal
Capacity
Ports of call Trade Routes 
G6 APL HOLLAND Owned 5,514 W / LA CC1, CC3, CC4
APL SCOTLAND Owned 5,514 W / LA CC1, CC3, CC4
APL ENGLAND Owned 5,514 W / LA CC1, CC3, CC4
HYD FORCE Owned 8,750 W / TA, Seattle NP2
HYD TOKYO chartered-in 6,763 W / LA CC1, CC3, CC4
HYD COURAGE Owned 8,562 W / TA NP2
APL/ HYD FAITH Owned 8,750 W / Seattle NP2
HYUNDAI FAITH Owned 8,750 W / LA CC1, CC3, CC4
HYD INTEGRAL Owned 4,922 E / NK CC1, CC3, CC4
HYD LOYALTY chartered-in 8,562 W / TA NP2, NP3
HYD MERCURY chartered-in 8,562 W / TA NP2, NP3
HYD Global Owned 8,562 W / TA, Seattle NP2
HYD New York chartered-in 6,350 W / LB CC1, CC3
HYD TACOMA chartered-in 6,350 W / LA CC1, CC3
MOL CALEDON chartered-in 4,922 E / Miami CC1, CC3
OOCL CHINA chartered-in 5,344 W / TA NP2, NP3
OOCL ANTWERP  Owned 5,888 W / LB CC2
OOCL ITALY chartered-in 5,888 W / LB CC2
OOCL KUALA LUMPUR chartered-in 5,888 W / LB CC2
NYK DENEB Owned 4,882 E / NY NCE
NYK REMUS Owned 4,922 E / SAV NCE
NYK TERRA Owned 6,622 W / LA, Oakland CC1, CC3, CC4
NYK TRITON Owned 6,500 W / LA CC1, CC3, CC4
NYK CONSTELLATION Owned 4,800 W / TA NP2
H-L PRAGUE EXPRESS Owned 8,580 W / TA NP2
 
2M MAERSK LINE ALBERT Owned 9,310 W / Seattle TP-9
ADRIAN MAERSK Owned 9,310 E / NY TP-11
MAERSK CLEMENTINE Owned 8,890 E / SAV TP-11
MAERSK ARNOLD Owned 9,310 W / Seattle TP-9
MSC HEIDI  Owned 8,402 W / LB Yang tse
MSC LUCIANA Owned 11,660 W / LB Jaguar Eastbound
MSC IVANA Owned 11,660 W / LB,Oakland Jaguar Eastbound
MSC NAVARINO chartered-in 8,530 W / LB Yang tse
MSC Rania Owned 8,402 W / LB Yang tse
MSC TEXAS chartered-in 8,238 W / LB Yang tse
MSC TORONTO chartered-in 8,089 W / LB Yang tse
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CKYHE COSCO KAOHSIUNG Owned 10,020 W / LB PSX 
COSCO GENOA Owned 4,253 E / NY AWE-2
COSCO TIANJIN Owned 5,570 W / Seattle PNW-COSCO
COSCO HONG KONG Owned 5,440 W / Seattle PNW-COSCO
COSCO JINHE Owned 5,440 W / Seattle PNW-COSCO
K-Line BAI CHAY BRIDGE Owned 4,432 W / LB PSW
K-Line BALTIMORE BRIDGE Owned 4,432 W / LB PSW
K-Line BAY BRIDGE Owned 4,432 W / LB PSW
K-Line BRUSSELS BRIDGE Owned 4,432 W / LB PSW
K-Line BREMEN BRIDGE chartered-in 5,888 E / NY, NK AWE-4
K-Line GLEN CANYON BRIDGEOwned 5,624 E / SAV AWE-4
K-Line VALENCIA BRIDGE Owned 4,734 E / WIL AWE-1, AWE-3
K-Line VECCHIO BRIDGE Owned 4,738 E / WIL AWE-1, AWE-3
K-Line VENICE BRIDGE Owned 4,738 E / WIL AWE-1, AWE-3
K-Line SUEZ CANAL BRIDGE Owned 5,608 E / NY AWE-4
K-Line AKINADA BRIDGE Owned 5,608 E / NY,SAV AWE-4
YM FOUNTAIN Owned 5,551 W / TA PNW
YM KAOHSIUNG chartered-in 4,031 E / WIL AWE-1, AWE-3
YM MARCH chartered-in 5,576 W / TA PNW
YM ETERNITY Owned 4,250 E / SAV AWE-1, AWE-3
YM PLUM Owned 5,551 W / TA PNW
YM GREAT chartered-in 5,570 E / NK AWE-4
HJ CONTI MADRID chartered-in 5,762 E / NY,SAV AWK
HJ Duesseldorf chartered-in 4,253 E / WIL AWE-1, AWE-3
HJ Montevideo chartered-in 4,250 E / WIL AWE-1, AWE-3
 
O3 CSCL Bohai Sea Owned 10,036 W / Oakland PSW-4
CSCL SPRING Owned 10,036 W / LA,Oakland PSW-4
CSCL Summer Owned 10,036 W / LA PSW-4
CSCL AUTUMN Owned 10,036 W / LA,Oakland PSW-4
CSCL YELLOW SEA Owned 10,000 W / LA,Oakland PSW-4
CSCL Xin Nan Tong Owned 4,051 E / SAV AAE-1
CSCL XIN YANG PU Owned 4,250 E / NY AAE-1
CSCL Xin Tai Cang Owned 4,253 E / NY, Miami AAE-1
CSCL VANCOUVER Owned 4,251 E / NY AAE-1
CMA-CGM NORMA Owned 9,415 W / LB,Oakland BOHAI  RIM
CMA CGM MEDEA Owned 9,415 W / LB BOHAI  RIM
CMA-CGM ORFEO chartered-in 9,661 W / LB BOHAI  RIM
CMA-CGM BIANCA chartered-in 8,465 W / Seattle Columbus PNW
CMA-CGM LA SCALA Owned 8,456 E / NY Columbus USEC 
CMA-CGM New Jersy Owned 5,042 E / Miami PEX-3
CMA-CGM DALILA Owned 8,465 W / Seattle Columbus PNW
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Source: Based on the service network information of relevant shipping companies 
b. Vessel Operating Cost 
Currently, due to the fact that the growth in the supply of containerships on the major 
trade lanes still marginally outpace that of the overall demands for the container 
shipments, the average freight rates among major shipping line on the transpacific 
trade lane still remained at a low level. In addition, maritime container shipping is 
highly sensitive (elastic) to bunker fuel costs as they represent between 45 and 50% 
of operating costs with limited opportunities to mitigate outside slow steaming. Still, 
from a comparative perspective, maritime shipping has less fuel price sensitivity than 
trucking and rail, implying that higher energy prices are likely to trigger the 
consideration of routing options that have a port call the closest possible to the 
destination of the shipments. 
 
For a standard Panamax containership of a capacity of 4,800TEUs, it has operational 
costs of about $9 million per year, among which the most significant expenses are 
related to fuel (46%) and port charges (21%) as shown in Figure 3, which are 
variable costs. This is translated into annual operating costs of about $2,314 per TEU. 
Not shown here are the significant amortization costs related to the ship purchase 
(principal and interest). The incentive to use larger containership is quite clear from 
the perspective of BCOs, which led to a new generation of 10,000 TEUs 
containerships being introduced in 2007. In this case, fuel and port charges account 
respectively for 50% and 21% of their annual operating costs, while manning costs 
remains constant. However, annual operating costs per TEU drop by more than one 
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half to $1,449. The principle of economies of scale is thus a strong factor in 
containerized maritime shipping. 
 
In this study, the port charge is intentionally excluded from the calculation of total 
cost per unit for each shipment, since the info of port charge is impossible to get on 
the individual voyage basis and it seems that the level port charge among major U.S. 
does not vary a lot. So the bunker fuel cost is what we take into account in the 
following calculation of total cost.  
Figure 3. Typical Components of Operating Cost for Containerships of Various Sizes  
 
Source: Operating Costs of Panamax and Post-Panamax Containerships, The 
Geography of Transport Systems, available at http://people.hofstra.edu 
/geotrans/eng/ch3en/conc3en/containeroperatingcosts.html 
 
Given the substantial difference in the average size of the vessel calling at U.S. East 
Coast and U.S. West Coast ports, the different cost profile for containership of 
various sizes is needed for further calculation of unit vessel operating cost. The most 
representative data on the cost profile can be achieved from USACE, the United 
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Sates Army Corps Engineer, as shown in the below Table 5 
 
Table5. The Main Component of Operating Cost for containerships of Various Sizes 
Vessel Size 4750 TEUs 5500 TEUs 7750 TEUs 10000 TEUs
Time Charter Rate /day US$8,100 US$9,400 US$13,745 US$17,100
Vessel Cost / day US$16,000 US$18,900 US$26,660 US$34,400
Fuel Consumption MT / day 133 154 217 280
Bunker Fuel Price US$600 US$600 US$600 US$600
Source: SeaIntel Sunday Spotlight, March 1, 2015, SeaIntel Maritime Analysis 
We can see from the Table 4 that the ocean carriers either own the vessel by itself or 
charter-in the vessel from other ship-owners. The time charter rate / day can serve as 
an approx. indicator of the balance of supply and demand of container shipping. At 
the point of time when these data was collect, since the overcapacity of fleet 
compared to the demand still exist among the major trade lane, so this set of data is 
well below that of the booming period back in 2007and 2008, which is more 
favorable to the ocean carrier as well as beneficial cargo owners, while the daily cost 
of vessel owned by the ocean carrier is relatively high and stable, which consists of 
significant amortization costs incurred by the purchase of the vessel, crew costs, 
repair &maintenance cost and voyage costs.  
 
c. Vessel Operations by Mega Alliances 
With the formation of mega shipping alliances on the major trade lanes in the recent 
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few years, major top 20 ocean carriers tend to no longer offer their respective 
shippers only by means of their own assets, instead they are working more closely 
with each other than ever before through slot exchange, vessel sharing etc. As the 
major four mega alliances on the transpacific route compete for higher market share 
of intermodal shipments, the individual service provided by each of them are 
differentiated in terms of many aspects, such as the number of weekly services 
offered by an given alliance between the given port-pair may be quite different from 
others For instance, G6 have more combined weekly liner service than CKYHE in 
the Port of Los Angeles, while the opposite is true for these two alliance in the Port 
of Long Beach; In addition, the schedule reliability of various ocean carriers show 
significant differences even if they belong to the same mega alliances and each of 
these ocean carriers has varying level of on-time performance among different port 
within the dataset, the aggregate info about the two indicators are shown in the below 
Table 6 and Table 7 respectively. 
Table 6. Weekly Services offered by ocean carriers at each POE 
              POE
Carrier
LA LB TA OA NK NY/NJ SAV WIL
Maersk 8 9 8 6 3 5 4 2
MSC 9 10 7 4 3 6 5 1
CMA-CGM 8 7 7 5 4 7 4 2
APL 8 6 4 6 3 5 5 3
Hapag-lloyd 7 7 6 5 3 4 5 2
NHK 5 3 4 2 3 5 3 2
MOL 3 3 2 1 1 2 3 1
HMM 3 4 3 2 1 3 3 2
OOCL 4 4 3 2 3 4 3 2
COSCO 4 5 4 2 2 4 3 1
K-Line 3 4 3 1 2 5 4 2
Yangming 3 3 2 1 1 3 3 2
Hanjin 4 4 3 2 1 4 3 2
Evergreen 3 4 3 2 1 3 2 1
CSCL 5 4 3 2 2 5 4 2  
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Source: Based on the data from Service Network of relevant Shipping Liners 
 
 
Table 7. Schedule Reliability of Ocean Carriers at each POE 
             POE
Carrier
LA LB TA OA NK NY/NJ SAV WIL
Maersk 85% 86% 81% 82% 72% 75% 74% 68%
MSC 80% 80% 76% 75% 65% 70% 68% 64%
CMA-CGM 82% 81% 78% 76% 68% 74% 73% 70%
APL 78% 79% 74% 73% 65% 69% 68% 64%
Hapag-lloyd 76% 80% 75% 74% 67% 70% 71% 65%
NHK 77% 78% 74% 73% 64% 68% 67% 63%
MOL 76% 75% 73% 72% 64% 68% 64% 62%
HMM 75% 75% 72% 71% 63% 67% 67% 64%
OOCL 74% 76% 74% 70% 63% 68% 66% 65%
COSCO 79% 80% 76% 75% 66% 70% 67% 64%
K-Line 77% 76% 73% 72% 68% 70% 68% 65%
Yangming 78% 77% 76% 75% 67% 68% 68% 67%
Hanjin 78% 78% 75% 73% 65% 69% 70% 67%
Evergreen 76% 77% 75% 74% 67% 69% 70% 68%
CSCL 80% 82% 76% 75% 68% 72% 68% 65%
 
Source: Based on the data from On-time Performance Report of relevant Shipping      
liners 
 
3.2.5 Railroad-related Attributes 
Currently, there are four major Class one freight railroads throughout the U.S which 
support the long-haul delivery of intermodal shipments. Of which BNSF and UP 
mainly serve the trade flow between the West Coast port range and inland market 
point, while CSX and NS are dedicated to fuel the shipment between the East Coast 
ports and major inland points. In this study, each individual port of entry is well 
served by the Class one railroads. The distance between each of these ports and 
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Chicago as the inland destination are quite different. At the same, the level of rail 
freight charged by rail carrier is not close to one another across the ports of entry, as 
evidence by the below Table 8 and Table 9. 
Table 8. Railroad Distance from various POE to Chicago (miles) 




2,119 2,162 2,418 2,200 889 1,083 991 866
 
Source: Based on data from the official website of BNSF, UP, CSX and NS 
 
Table 9. Rail Freight Rates by Selected Class One Rail Carriers (USD / Ton-Mile)  






NS N/A 5.71  
Source: Rail Freight - Q2 2014 Summary North American Railroads 
As can be seen from the Table 9, the freight rates charged by the Eastern railroad are 
relatively higher than that of Western counterparts. Since the intermodal rail rate is 
generally even higher than freight rate of maritime leg, so this part of cost will be 




3.2.6 Panama Canal Toll Structure 
The Panama Canal toll system is most recently revised in 2011, which invariably 
followed the trend of previous revision by raising both loaded and total capacity 
portion of the toll charge. Since a set of much-larger Neo-Panamax lock complex 
will be put into use when the expansion of the Panama Canal is completed, the 
Panama Canal Authority has just put forward a whole-new toll structure as shown in 
Figure 4, which will be designated for the containership segments. 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of New Toll Structure with the Existing One 
 
Source: Proposal to Modify the Regulations for the Admeasurement of Vessels and 
the Panama Canal Toll System, January 2015  
 
To be more detail, the new toll proposal will include the following highlights; 
1. Differentiate the vessel total TEU allowance (TTA) capacity tariff and the TEU 
loaded with cargo tariff to be charged to full container vessels using the 
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Neo-Panamax locks and/or the new locks. 
2. No additional charge for the transport of empty containers at the moment of 
transit, as determined by the ACP. 
Reducing the existing vessel total TEU allowance (TTA) tariff and increase the 
existing TEU loaded with cargo tariff to the full container vessels that can currently 
transit the Panama Canal and that will continue to use the Neo-Panamax locks. 
In addition to the new toll structure, the Panama Canal Authority will also introduce 
the “Customer Loyalty Program for Full Containerships” which intends to classify 
the canal users into four categories based customers’ commitment of cumulative 
TEU volumes of Total TEU Allowance to be achieved within one year. And the 
preferential tariffs will be specially applied to the respective categories to give 
varying level of extra discount as shown below compared to the corresponding tariff. 
Category 4: regular tariff, without variation. 
Category 3: tariff which reflects a $1.00 improvement on the vessel capacity tariff 
(TEU allowance). 
Category 2: tariff which reflects a $2.00 improvement on the vessel capacity tariff 
(TEU allowance). 
Category 1: tariff which reflects a $3.00 improvement on the vessel capacity tariff 
(TEU allowance). 
 
The combination of the new toll structure and corresponding loyalty program is 
expected to create more cost savings for the upcoming Neo-Panamax containership 
for the year to come, so in the next chapter, this part of saving will be used to check 






3.3 Multinomial Logistic Regression Model  
As previously stated in the section of literature review, the discrete choice analysis 
has been applied to study of the port choice by shippers. As one of the branch of 
discrete choice analysis, the multinomial logistic regression model is selected in this 
study to examine the impact of various potential factors on the choice of alternative 
ports for their container shipments and give some prediction for the change in the 
port choice due to the variation in some of major factors which may well 
materialized following the year when the Panama Canal Expansion is completed.  
 
3.3.1 Components of the Multinomial Logistic Regression Model 
The multinomial logistic regression (hereinafter called “MLR”) is in essence used to 
model nominal outcome variable (as compared to the consecutive variable 
commonly in the ordinary regression model), in which the log odds of the outcomes 
are modeled as a linear combination of the predictor variables. The mathematical 
expression is as follows: 
 
ln(Pi/Pb)= a+b1*X1+b2*X2+……bn*Xn 
Pi:: The estimated probability of outcome categories of interest being selected  
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Pb: The estimated probability of baseline category being selected 
Xn: The predictor variables of interest selected at the discretion of users 
bn: The regression coefficient which represents the change in log odds per unit 
change of the corresponding predictor variable. 
 
In this study, eight U.S. ports of entry (hereinafter “POE”) as selected from the 
shipment records of PIERS amount to the nominal outcome variables in the MLR 
and the probability of a POE being chosen for each individual shipment is modeled 
as a linear function of factors describing the following three parts: 
1. the attributes of vessel operation by ocean carriers  
2. the attributes of container terminals of each POE’s  
3. the attributes of total shipment (with the impact of the Panama Canal and the 
U.S. intermodal railroad taken into consideration) 
 
3.3.2 Selection of Predictor Variables 
In the current context of container shipping, ocean carriers tend to select the port of 
entry for container shipment on behalf of their shippers. There are two assumptions 
hold that the short or near-term vessel fleet and operation configuration remain 
unchanged during the time period for the shipment within the dataset; The 
overcapacity of vessel fleet relative to demand for shipping shall guarantee the 
availability of slot for the delivery of shipment on any intended vessel. 
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1. In terms of the elevation of ocean carriers and their corresponding vessel 
operations, what the shippers care most about is basically the three indicators: freight 
rates, transit time and schedule reliability. The mix of these factors might be quite 
different among the major ocean carriers for various POEs as shown in Table 4~ 
Table 6. In that sense, these three indicators are selected as part of the predictor 
variables of the MLR for further test. Besides, the number of weekly services 
between Port of Shanghai and the alternative ports of entry is valued by many 
shippers, since they will have more choices within a week to make their container 
shipment arrive in U.S. inland market on schedule.  
2. The performance of gateway ports are playing increasingly important role in the 
port choice by ocean carriers at the discretion of shippers. Currently the severe 
congestion take its toll on the west coast ports, which have cost millions of dollars on 
the stakeholders of container shipping industry every day. Although the west coast 
ports are generally equipped with more advanced quay cranes and relevant container 
yard infrastructure compared to their eastern counterparts, these ports are still faced 
up with severe backlog of both cargos and vessels. The container storage space may 
be one of causes for slowdown of cargo move at many west coast ports since the 
capacity of terminal to handle ever-growing cargo is restrained by the limited size of 
the storage space; In addition, even though east coast ports has handle more cargos 
bounded for the local market than ever before, but their inability to accommodate the 
much-larger post-Panamax containerships due to the lack of enough harbor depth 
prevent them from gaining more cargos destined to vast inland markets. So the 
harbor depth is another critical factor to be considered in the port choice.  
3. The toll charged by the Panama Canal Authority on the containerships transiting 
the canal play its own role in the overall cost of ocean leg delivery. In addition, 
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inland intermodal rail rates have a lion share of entire container shipping cost. So the 
Panama Canal Toll charge is included in the ocean freight charge for vessels 
transiting the Canal to the East Coast ports. The combination of both ocean shipment 
cost and inland rail charge form as the variable of total shipment cost, 
4. Also the total transit time from Shanghai to Chicago via various POEs is also 
regarded as a potential factor in the MLR model. 
 
Now, altogether five different potential predict variables from various aspects which 
may be of great concern for the following analysis have been selected among 
multiple of candidate variables in anticipation of mirroring the real-world 
consideration of shippers for their individual shipments. Now, the eight alternative 
Ports of entry as the outcome variables and five different attribute variables of 
interest are organized in the Excel 2010 for further analysis, with part of the dataset 






























WIL 63 1750 45 3 60 34
WIL 60 1800 42 5 59 30
WIL 72 1100 45 4 60 32
WIL 60 1800 48 2 58 26
WIL 81 1800 45 3 59 33
WIL 66 1850 45 4 61 34
WIL 63 1300 42 2 60 30
WIL 60 1700 45 2 61 22
WIL 69 1800 47 3 58 20
WIL 63 1550 42 2 60 33
NK 63 1600 48 5 66 30
NK 72 2000 49 4 64 34
NK 69 1300 50 4 65 26
NK 78 1700 48 6 64 20
NK 81 1200 50 2 67 18
NK 66 1500 48 3 65 24
NK 66 1450 48 5 65 26
NK 72 1750 45 3 65 30
NK 63 1600 47 6 64 29
NK 72 1700 46 4 63 28
NK 69 1500 45 5 66 30
 
 
Due to the limited space as required in the study, only portion of the 317 container 
                                                             
12
 The dataset involved in this table is just part of the total 317 records of container shipments from Shanghai to 
Chicago 
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shipment records from Shanghai to Chicago are shown in Table 6. These individual 
shipment records are select elaborately to represent the actual port choice by 317 
different shippers for their individual container shipments. Most importantly, these 
port choice set within the data is compliance with the law of Irrelevant Independent 
Alternative (IIA) as required by the MLR, that is the relative possibility of one port 
being chosen over the other port within the dataset won’t be affected by the existence 
or omission of a third ports. In addition, IIA require the outcome variables can 
include as many potential outcomes as possible. In this sense, port choice set in this 
study basically meet this requirement since it cover almost all the major container 
ports in the U.S. while the rest ports are generally neglected by the main shipping 
lines on the transpacific trade route, which means the POEs involved in the dataset 





Chapter 4: Analysis and Results 
 
 
4.1 The Method of Analysis 
There is a variety of analytical software available for the fitting of MLR Model. In 
this study, SPSS is chosen as the analytical tool to examine the extent of impact 
aforementioned factors would have on the probability of each port being chosen for 
individual container shipment within the dataset.  
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Before we get started with fitting the proposed MLR Model into SPSS, the 
relationship between the variables was first investigated using regression analysis. 
The correlations between the predictor variables are shown in Table11. 
















Total Cost / TEU -0.363 1.000
Harbor Depth 0.138 -0.362 1.000
Weekly Services 0.246 -0.304 0.165 1.000
Port Productivity 0.137 -0.320 0.212 0.207 1.000
Total Transit Time -0.262 0.372 -0.259 -0.242 -0.328 1.000
 
 
Judging from the results of regression analysis shown above, it can be the that there 
is not any pair predict variables with a high level of correlation, that is to say, each 
predictor variables’ role in the MLR will not be in conflict with other predictor 
variable’s, which make sure the feasibility of the MLR model to the most extent. 
In addition, the various correlation between two predict variables all reflect the 
desired relationship of those variables as we could expect from the practice. Take the 
“Total cost per TEU” for example, its positive correlation with the “Total Transit 
Time” is just the case for the shipment from Shanghai to Chicago moving through 
different gateways since the transit time is observably longer for the all-water route 
than the intermodal route. At the same time, the total cost for the shipment is also 
marginally lower than that of all-water route in the current context.  
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The initial output generated by SPSS on “MLR Analysis” consisting of a series of 
indicators which give users a general understanding of whether the factors involved 
in the MLR model are of enough significance to explain the possibility of each 
outcome variables being chosen compared to baseline outcome variables. The detail 
information are shown in Table 12.1- Table 12.3 
According to the figure of some relevant indicators in Table 12 series, all the five 
predict variables fit quite well with the MLR model since they are all of great 
significance to the outcome variables as the significance value for predict variables 
are below 0.05 when the analysis is set at the confidence level of 95%. Then we need 
to go on to have an in-depth view on each predict variable’s significance on the port 
choice. 














Table 12.2 Pseduo R-Square 















Intercept 820.459 12.076 7 0.048
Reliability 846.648 38.264 7 0.000
Total Cost 870.837 62.454 7 0.000
Harbor Depth 835.682 27.299 7 0.000
Weekly Service 869.887 61.504 7 0.000
Port Productivity 846.291 37.908 7 0.000










LA Intercept 9.867 5.272 2.475 1 0.160
On-time Ratio -0.109 0.040 7.388 1 0.007 0.896 0.829 0.97
Total Cost 0.324 0.002 4.987 1 0.026 1.385 1.174 1.708
Harbor Depth -0.169 0.076 4.913 1 0.027 0.845 0.727 0.981
Weekly Service -0.539 0.143 14.125 1 0.000 0.583 0.44 0.773
Port Productivity -0.010 0.006 2.904 1 0.048 0.990 0.979 1.002




Port of Entry β Std. Error wald
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NK Intercept 31.083 11.682 7.079 1 0.008
On-time Ratio -0.349 0.079 19.435 1 0.000 0.706 0.604 0.824
Total Cost 0.817 0.003 33.614 1 0.000 2.217 1.711 2.823
Harbor Depth -0.658 0.158 17.294 1 0.000 0.519 0.382 0.706
Weekly Service -1.667 0.327 26.025 1 0.000 0.189 0.100 0.358
Port Productivity -0.050 0.014 16.582 1 0.000 0.946 0.921 0.971
Total Time 0.742 0.133 31.012 1 0.000 2.100 1.618 2.727
NY Intercept 11.586 7.809 2.201 1 0.013
On-time Ratio -0.229 0.053 18.721 1 0.000 0.795 0.717 0.892
Total Cost 0.651 0.02 25.147 1 0.000 1.881 1.506 2.285
Harbor Depth -0.286 0.101 8.075 1 0.004 0.751 0.616 0.915
Weekly Service -0.680 0.193 12.441 1 0.000 0.507 0.347 0.739
Port Productivity -0.030 0.08 13.477 1 0.000 0.971 0.955 0.986
Total Time 0.604 0.105 32.759 1 0.000 1.829 1.487 2.249
OAK Intercept 19.868 9.750 4.152 1 0.042
On-time Ratio -0.308 0.067 21.173 1 0.000 0.735 0.645 0.838
Total Cost 0.584 0.002 33.628 1 0.000 2.009 1.508 2.494
Harbor Depth -0.221 0.126 11.164 1 0.000 0.656 0.585 0.840
Weekly Service -1.102 0.242 20.797 1 0.000 0.332 0.285 0.534
Port Productivity -0.048 0.011 19.706 1 0.000 0.953 0.944 0.974
Total Time 0.569 0.118 32.351 1 0.000 1.953 1.487 2.460
SAV Intercept 14.882 8.337 3.186 1 0.054
On-time Ratio -0.254 0.056 20.314 1 0.000 0.776 0.695 0.866
Total Cost 0.702 0.002 29.690 1 0.000 2.012 1.608 2.416
Harbor Depth -0.325 0.107 9.193 1 0.000 0.722 0.585 0.891
Weekly Service -0.856 0.204 17.561 1 0.000 0.425 0.285 0.634
Port Productivity -0.040 0.009 19.600 1 0.000 0.961 0.944 0.978
Total Time 0.610 0.109 31.513 1 0.000 1.840 1.487 2.277
TA Intercept 7.973 6.817 1.368 1 0.024
On-time Ratio -0.149 0.045 10.809 1 0.001 0.861 0.788 0.942
Total Cost 0.482 0.02 15.576 1 0.000 1.619 1.354 1.951
Harbor Depth -0.226 0.086 6.909 1 0.009 0.798 0.674 0.944
Weekly Service -0.487 0.166 8.657 1 0.003 0.614 0.444 0.850
Port Productivity -0.028 0.007 6.944 1 0.008 0.982 0.970 0.995
Total Time 0.479 0.095 25.302 1 0.000 1.614 1.339 1.945
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WIL Intercept 52.031 18.848 7.62 1 0.006
On-time Ratio -0.445 0.103 18.619 1 0.000 0.641 0.523 0.784
Total Cost 1.026 0.004 19.973 1 0.000 2.782 2.009 3.523
Harbor Depth -1.012 0.279 13.281 1 0.000 0.362 0.209 0.625
Weekly Service -3.156 0.665 22.524 1 0.000 0.043 0.012 0.157
Port Productivity -0.056 0.019 7.790 1 0.000 0.947 0.921 0.984





4.2 The Implication of Status Quo 
According to the results of Parameter Estimate in Table 13, It can be clearly seen that 
the β( the regression coefficient of the predict variable) of “Number of Weekly 
Services” is relatively higher than that of any other predictor variables in each POE. 
In the case of the Port of Wilmington, with each one unit increment in the number of 
the weekly services for this POE, the log odds of the Port of Wilmington being 
chosen for a shipment over that of the Port of Long Beach will decline by 3.156 units. 
This statement can be translated into the fact that the shipper who needs more weekly 
liner services to one port for his shipment is more likely to select the Port of Long 
Beach compared to the Port of Wilmington, which is exactly one of the main reasons 
why the port of Long Beach is most frequently selected outcome within this dataset. 
In the second place, “Total Cost” from Shanghai to Chicago is second only to the 
“Number of Weekly Services” in its impact on the port choice. This can be mainly 
explained by the fact that Shippers in the Midwest imported more medium and 
low-value commodities from Shanghai than high-value ones, where they tend to 
favor the relatively cost effective routing for their shipments with the consideration 
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of lower the inventory carrying cost as much as possible. In the next section, the 
effect of reduction in cost differential between routing via the USEC and USWC on 
the port choice decision will be further examined in the context of expanded Panama 
Canal. 
Third, the coefficientβof “Total Transit Time ” is a little bit lower than that of 
“Total Cost” for each POE, which suggested that the most shippers do not 
necessarily choose the routing with shorter transit time when an alternative route is 
more cost effective. The potential change in Total Transit time resulted from the new 
Panama Canal will also be discussed in the next section. 
Furthermore, theβof port-related attributes has similar implication on the port 
choice just as “Weekly Services” and “Total Transit Time”. As for the “Harbor 
depth”, it revealed that the deeper harbors are more attractive to shippers than 
shallower ones. The impact that projected change in the harbor depth of several East 
Coast ports will have on the port choice will be quantitatively measured in the next 
section; Also, the result shows that the “Port Productivity” is not playing the 
equivalent important role in the port choice as “Harbor Depth”, which is mainly 
attributable to the greater improvement made by USEC ports in port productivity 
compared to USWC counterparts, and thanks to much less congestion and more 
sufficient qualified dock workers in the USEC. 
 
 
4.3 Post Panama Canal Expansion Scenario 
The outcome of above MLR analysis shed light on the extent of each predictable 
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variable in determining the possibility of each POE of U.S. being chosen for an 
individual container shipment from Shanghai as compared to baseline Port of Long 
Beach. While it is widely believed that several factors as involved in the predict 
variables will experience varying level of change after the completion of Panama 
Canal Expansion 
First of all, several ports up and down the U.S. East Coast are scheduled to deepen 
their harbors in the years following the completion of Panama Canal; 
Second, the projected revision in the toll structure proposed by Panama Canal 
Authority together with the deployment of larger post-Panamax containerships shall 
bring about positive change to the unit cost of shipment in the ocean leg; 
In addition, some expected change in several important attributes related to vessel 
operations will also play their roles in the POE choice by shippers in coming years. It 
is important to note that all the following analysis are based on the assumption that 
the relevant predictor variables with respect to the West Coast ports will kept 
unchanged from the status quos since the most of the positive changes are expected 
to occur to the U.S. East Coast ports which are regarded as the major beneficiaries of 
the Panama Canal expansion. 
So in this section, the potential changes which are almost for certain in the near 
future on some of the predict variable will be incorporated into the dataset of 
individual shipment to further examine the potential effect of these variables in the 
POE’s attractiveness to the great number of shippers in terms of the possibility of 
being selected compared to the Port of Long Beach. 
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Scenario 1: Revised Port Depths 
As is shown in the output of “Parameter Estimates” in the previous section, “Harbor 
Depth” is an import factor to be considered in port choice which ranked third among 
the five predict variables. By reference to the port deepening project proposed by 
various East Coast ports, the Port of New York and the Port of Savannah will mostly 
likely to obtain the grants from the Federal Government for their respective project. 
As for the Port of New York, the average harbor depth of various terminals will 
increase from current level of 45 feet to 50 feet in the next two years; Harbor depth 
for Port of Savannah will rise significantly from 42.5 feet to 48 feet. The comparison 
of output of parameter estimates for the harbor depth is shown at Table 14. 
 
Table 14. Comparison of Harbor Depth Parameter  
Pre-Deepening β Exp(β)
LA -0.205 0.814 0.727 0.981
NK -0.578 0.561 0.380 0.706
NY -0.330 0.719 0.616 0.915
OAK -0.401 0.669 0.585 0.840
SAV -0.448 0.639 0.585 0.891
TA -0.284 0.753 0.674 0.944




LA -0.187 0.830 0.730 0.943
NK -0.525 0.591 0.484 0.723
NY -0.190 0.847 0.654 1.089
OAK -0.363 0.695 0.584 0.828
SAV -0.224 0.795 0.636 0.932
TA -0.258 0.773 0.674 0.944
WIL -0.645 0.525 0.209 0.625
95% Confidence Interval
 
As we can see from comparison of harbor depth parameter for each POE, Exp(β) for 
the Port of New York has risen from the current 0.719 to the projected 0.847, that is 
translated to say that the Port of New York is currently 0.719 less likely to be chosen 
by shippers who value deeper harbor than the baseline port of Long Beach, while in 
the near future when the harbor deepening is completed, the Port of New York will 
increase its possibility of being chosen by a factor of 0.13. So from the statistics 
point of view, the Port of New York will close the gap with the Port of Long Beach 
in terms of its possibility to be chosen due to the improvement of harbor depth with 
all other factors being equal. The Port of Savannah is expected to achieve a more 
striking performance with a nearly 40% increase in likelihood being chosen than 
right now solely due to the significant improvement in harbor depth. To be more 
specific, the Port of New York will surpass the Port of Los Angeles with the 
improvement of Port depth alone in terms of its likelihood of being chosen for an 
individual shipment which is reflected by its Exp(β) of 0.847; the Port of Savannah 
will also overtake the Port of Tacoma in the USWC in terms of its attractiveness 
discretionary shippers due to the deeper harbor. 
 
Scenario 2: Revised Panama Canal Toll Charge 
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As is shown in Figure 4 in the previous Chapter, the newly proposed toll structure for 
full containership will more focus on the portion of laden containers on board in the 
total toll charge for a containership. Given the primary data compiled by PIERS, the 
size of all the containerships currently calling at the East Coast ports either via the 
Panama Canal or the Suez Canal ranges from 4250 TEU to 8750 TEU, the sole effect 
of the change in Canal toll will be examined with the harbor depths of various East 
Coast ports remain unchanged.  
As a matter of fact, the potential cost savings for containerships range in size from 
4200TEUs to 8550TEUs are as follows: 
1. For 4250~6000 TEU containership transiting the Neo-Panamax Lock, the toll 
charge per unit will be even higher as compared to the current toll charge. So it is 
better for these containerships to continue transit the old Panamax Lock with no 
cost savings accrued to them. 
2. For 6000~9000 TEU containership with 90% utilization rate, it is better for them 
to transit the Neo-Panamax Lock due to the potential cost saving in toll charge of 
$5 per TEU compared to transit the existing Suez Canal. 
The Parameter Estimate for the effect of change in toll charge is shown as below. 
Table15. Comparison of parameter estimate for Total Cost per TEU 
       (Revised Toll Charge) 
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β Exp(β)
LA 0.004 1.004 1.000 1.007
NK 0.017 1.017 1.011 1.023
NY 0.010 1.010 1.006 1.015
OAK 0.014 1.011 1.007 1.018
SAV 0.012 1.012 1.008 1.016
TA 0.070 1.007 1.004 1.011




LA 0.005 1.005 1.002 1.008
NK 0.016 1.015 1.012 1.020
NY 0.009 1.008 1.006 1.012
OAK 0.014 1.012 1.010 1.018
SAV 0.010 1.009 1.006 1.013
TA 0.008 1.008 1.005 1.011
WIL 0.016 1.016 1.014 1.024
95% Confidence Interval
 
As we can see from the Table 15 that for the time being, the shipper who value lower 
total cost per TEU will be 1.017, 1,010, 1011 more likely to choose the Port of Long 
Beach than the Port of Norfolk, Port of New York and Port of Savannah. When the 
new toll fee is put into use, these three gateway ports in the East Coast will 
respectively close the gap with the Port of Long Beach in terms of their possibility of 
being chosen for shipments, although the extent of progress is not enough to catch up 
with that of their West Coast counterparts. So it can be inferred that only by 
improvement of toll structure for containership is far not enough to make the 
all-water route through the Panama Canal competitive with the West Coast 
intermodal route in terms of the cost effectiveness. 
 
Scenario 3: Revised Vessel Size 
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The vessel fleet size of shipping alliance is kept at the current level to examine the 
effect of change in toll charge on the port choice. It is more likely that in the near 
future the ratio of post-Panamax containerships in the vessel fleet will be 
significantly increase for various shipping alliance on the All-water service route via 
the Panama Canal. As the initial projection by the Panama Canal Authority, the work 
horse size of containerships transiting the expanded Panama Canal will stand at 
about 9,500 TEUs. So in this section, it is assumed that US East Coast Ports (With 
the exception of the Port of Wilmington) will be able to handle the containerships up 
to 8,500TEU in size in the near future. The much larger vessels to be deployed will 
greatly improve the fuel efficiency which will in turn reduce the mounting ratio of 
bunker fuel cost in the total operating cost for shipping alliances, as a result, the cost 
saving in terms of vessel operating cost can be expected to the same extent which has 
been achieved inherent in the vessels deployed on the Transpacific West Coast port 
routes. In addition, the revised toll charge is much more preferential for the 
containerships in this range of size. As such, the combined impact of larger vessel 
and improvement of Canal toll on the total cost per TEU will be evaluated as below. 
 
 
Table.16 Comparison of Parameter Estimates for Total Cost per TEU 
        (Combined effect of Vessel Size and Toll Charge) 
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β Exp(β)
LA 0.004 1.004 1.000 1.007
NK 0.017 1.017 1.011 1.023
NY 0.010 1.010 1.006 1.015
OAK 0.014 1.011 1.007 1.018
SAV 0.012 1.012 1.008 1.016
TA 0.070 1.007 1.004 1.011




LA 0.005 1.005 1.002 1.008
NK 0.016 1.015 1.012 1.020
NY 0.009 1.005 1.006 1.012
OAK 0.014 1.012 1.010 1.018
SAV 0.010 1.007 1.006 1.013
TA 0.008 1.008 1.005 1.011
WIL 0.015 1.016 1.014 1.024
95% Confidence Interval
 
As we can see from the Table 16, the possibility of Port of New York being chosen 
for a shipment is exactly the same with that of Port of Los Angeles as reflected by 
their Exp(β) of 1.005; the Port of Savannah also make a great leap forward in its 
possibility of being selected for the shipment. The Norfolk seems to made less 
significant progress compared to the Port of Savannah and Port of New York with 
the help of improvement in the total cost, while the progress made by the Port of 
Wilmington is almost negligible. 
 
 
Scenario 4: Reduction in Total Transit Time  
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The total transit time for intermodal shipment via the U.S. East Coast is composed of 
the ocean sailing time, Panama Canal time and inland rail transit time. The effect of 
the Expanded Panama Canal is still very much in the air, which is impossible to 
estimate any potential change in leg of shipment at the this point of time. Due to the 
current severe congestion in the USWC ports, the substantial time advantage hold by 
the intermodal route via the USWC over the USEC has been greatly undermined. 
If the new all-water route via the expanded Panama Canal is less time-consuming 
than ever before as expected by the ACP, together with the efficient port handling 
offered by the major gateways as well as the improvement of rail transit time to the 
inland destination of Chicago, the USEC ports will benefit more from the positive 
change in this indicator than their USWC counterparts. 
 
Scenario 5：Liner Service Improvement 
As shown in the initial parameter estimates for all predict variables, Both the “No. of 
weekly Services” and “Schedule Reliability” offered by shipping lines exert 
significant influence over the port choice by shippers, it remained to be seen how 
will various shipping lines as members of major shipping alliances and relevant port 
authorities of both coasts work more closely with each other in pursuit of better 
performance in both of the indicators. Since there is a growing trend among some 
big-box retailers towards positioning more of their distribution center close to the 
major USEC ports to better serve the populous markets in the Midwest and Eastern 
part of the U.S., the mega shipping alliance will have greater incentive to ply more 
shipping routes which directly call at several USEC ports with consideration of 
providing more reliable and less time-consuming services to shippers.  
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Scenario 6: Improved Port Productivity  
As an important measure of operating efficiency of port terminals, it mainly reflect 
the vessel operating performance for the container terminal in terms of the total 
number of containers moved per vessel per hour. According to the parameter 
estimates as shown in Table13, shippers are more likely to opt for the west coast 
ports with higher port productivity, while the indicator itself is not as significant as 
other predict variables involved in this analysis. This is most likely due to the fact 
that the highly efficient container handling equipment at USWC ports is 
compromised by the issue of labor disputes as well as chassis dislocation, while the 
USEC ports seems to perform better than some of the west coast ports although they 
are generally as well-equipped as their USWC counterparts. If these obstacles in the 
USWC can be addressed in the near future when the expansion of Panama Canal is 
completed, this indicator may be a precise measure of port handling capacity. In that 
sense, if USEC ports can keep upgrading their port infrastructure to maintain the 
high-performance of container handling, their effort will be destined to pay off. 
 
 
4.4 Conclusions from the Comparison Study: 
From the above quantitative comparison study on the effect of change in “Harbor 
Depth” and “Total Cost” on the port choice with the consideration of the Expanded 
Panama Canal, we can clearly see that the deepen harbor will make USEC container 
ports more attractive to their shippers in the Midwest of U.S. in terms of the 
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likelihood of being chosen for potential shipment. The Port of New York’s 
attractiveness to the shipper will rank second only to that of the Port of Los Angeles, 
while the Port of Savannah will overtake the Port of Tacoma, one of the major 
gateway in the USWC. So if the deepened harbor can be in place in the near future, 
the Port of New York and the Port of Savannah will gain more popularity compared 
to the current status. 
 
Total Cost savings resulting from the revised Panama Canal toll charge and the 
increase in the container vessel size are expected to exert the most powerful 
influence on the port choice by the shippers in the Midwest of U.S.. While the 
attractiveness of Port of New York and the Port of Savannah almost reach parity with 
that of port of Los Angeles, the remaining two USEC ports; Port of Norfolk and 
Wilmington show not much of significant improvement in performance due to the 
lower total cost, for the Port of Norfolk, there are already some post-Panamax 
containerships choose to call it due to its 50 feet harbor depth, so the additional 
benefit of mega vessels along with the revised toll charge by PCA alone will have 
quite limited impact on its improved attractiveness to the shippers. 
 
Total Transit Time is also a critical predict variable in determining the port choice 
especially for the USEC ports. However, no potential change in this indicator is 
available right now, which is also the case with two vessel operating-related 
attributes and port productivity, so any change in these predict variables which can 
be obtained in the near future will need to be examined in the MLR analysis model to 






Chapter 5: Conclusion and Improvement 
 
The fitting of MLR model into SPSS is used as the methodology in this study of port 
choice by shippers, which finally shed light on the relative attractiveness of various 
US gateway seaports to the container shipment from Shanghai to Chicago based on 
the several predict variables of great significance to port choice, As can be observed 
from the outcome of analysis in the previous chapter, both the vessel 
operation-related and port terminal-related attributes are statistically significant in 
explaining the port choice by shippers. It is critical to note that two compounding 
predict variables of “Total Cost” and “Total Transit Time” are playing their own 
important roles in the selection of ports of entry through which door-to-door 
container shipment are moving to the final destination. The combined effect of toll 
charge imposed by the PCA and trend of deploying larger containerships is specially 
examined quantitatively in the study to predict the change in the relative ratio odds of 
alternative POEs, which reflects that the USEC ports are likely to grab more 
intermodal container shipment market share than ever before at the expense of some 
current leading west coast ports, while the effect of change in other components of 
shipping cost such as bunker fuel price, rail transit cost are not taken into account in 
this study since their future trends are unpredictable at present.  
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The future operational scheme by ACP is a key to the competiveness of route 
through the expanded Panama Canal. If ACP can better control the number of 
container ships to be transit every day, combine with improved toll charge on 
containerships, the more reliable and time-efficient service can be rendered to the 
shipping liners, which will in turn greatly benefit the trade routes moving through the 
USEC ports. 
The total cost savings achieved by the combined newly proposed Panama Canal toll 
charge and deployment of larger Post Panamax containerships will greatly increase 
the possibility of the Top 2 USEC ports being chosen for the potential shipments at 
the expense of the major USWC ports.  
The vessel operation-related issues are of great importance as analyzed in this study 
it remains to be seen how the major shipping liners will revise their operating 
structure on the major trade routes moving through both USWC and USEC in terms 
of weekly services and schedule reliability in response to the new normal of 
expanded Panama Canal and newly-upgraded USEC ports.  
At the end of the day, whether the expanded Panama Canal will bring about an 
expected paradigm shift in the routing options through which a host of POEs are 
selected for container shipments destined to the U.S. inland market will depend on 
the potential changes in all the predict variables incurred to the ports on both coast. 
At the very least, the USEC ports will more or less attract some of shippers who want 
to further diversify their routing options to counter any unexpected dynamic incurred 
on their preferred route by offering more alternatives in the port choice.   
As a whole, there are some limitations involved in this paper which need to be 
further improved in the future study.  
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First, the basic dataset involved in this study is only reflective of the actual situation 
of container shipment from Shanghai to Chicago within a peak shipping month, 
while the results from this study may not be as accurate as the actual cases due to the 
restriction of time horizon. So in the future research, the time horizon of the dataset 
could be extended as long as possible so as to better reveal the actual port choice by 
shippers in the context of ever-changing container shipping industry.  
Second，all the USWC ports involved in this study are assumed to be unchanged 
from the status quo in terms of the relevant predict variables determining the port 
choice. But in reality, the west coast gateways are poised to take aggressive actions 
to further upgrade their port facilities in an effort to prevent the large scale diversion 
of discretionary cargos to their east coast counterparts. In this sense, it can be said 
that the possible post Panama Canal Expansion situation may not likely to be as 
simple as the assumptions proposed in this study. So any change to the attributes 
related to the intermodal route via the USWC ports shall be taken into account to 
give full comprehensive and practical evaluation of impact of Panama Canal 
expansion on the port choice by shippers. 
Third, the potential change in some components of “Total Cost” including bunker 
fuel price and U.S. inland railroad charge shall be taken into consideration in the 
future study to better reflect the actual total cost saving of alternative routings. The 
same is true for the “Total Transit Time”, “No. of Weekly Service”, “Schedule 
Reliability” and “Port Productivity” as the potential changes in all of these predict 
variable shall determine the new landscape of routing options for the U.S. 
containerized imports from Asia. 
In terms of the value of this study, it is the first study ever to implement the MLR 
model to analyze the contribution of various factors determining the port choice of 
60 
discretionary cargo shippers in the U.S., and further examine the impact of change in 
some of these factors on the port choice under the new normal of expanded Panama 
Canal. At the same time, it can be extended to be a decision-making tool for various 
port authorities to increase the attractiveness of ports to discretionary cargo shippers 
by offering state-of-the-art port facilities and working closely with all the 
stakeholders along the route including ACP, shipping liners and inland railroad 
carriers to make sure that the relative cost-effective, less time-consuming and reliable 
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